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SYMPOSIUM ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
MargaretA. Berger*

After a protracted pregnancy' and a difficult delivery, 2 the
Federal Rules of Evidence' are celebrating their first birthday-an event deserving of a symposium devoted to how the new
arrival is faring. All complex statutes, it seems fair to venture,
suffer growing pains, as possible ambiguities in draftsmanship,
inconsistencies between sections, and omissions of coverage are
probed by attorneys, the courts and, of course, contributors to law
reviews in articles such as those which follow.
Although some unresolved problems remain, it is already
clear that the infant evidence code is destined to be a leader. As
of July 1, 1976 (its first anniversary), five states-Arkansas,4
Maine, 5 Nebraska,' New Mexico, 7 and Wisconsins-had adopted
some version of the Federal Rules. Florida's enactment bears an
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. Radcliffe College, 1953; J.D.

Columbia University, 1956. Coeditor, J. WEINSTEN & M. BERGER,

WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

(1975).

1. The Advisory Committee which drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence was appointed in March 1965. Its Preliminary Draft was published in March 1969. 46 F.R.D.
161 (1969).

2. After promulgation by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, the Rules were
transmitted to Congress and were to take effect on July 1, 1973, unless disapproved by
Congress within ninety days. Congress proceeded to defer the effective date of the Rules
until such time as they were affirmatively enacted, which finally occurred in December
1974. The Rules were signed into law on January 2, 1975.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. FEDERAL RuLEs or EVIDENCE 101-1103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FED.
R. EVID.].
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1976) (effective July 1, 1976).
5. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit: 14, § 6101 (Supp. 1975) (effective Feb. 2, 1976).

6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-101 to § 27-1103 (Supp. 1975) (effective Aug. 24, 1975).
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-101 to § 20-4-1102 (Supp. 1975), as amended N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-4-105 to § 20-4-1101 (Interim Supp. 1976) (originally effective July 1, 1973;
amendments effective Apr. 1, 1976).
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 901.01 to § 901.07 (1975) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
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effective date of July 1, 1977,1 and other states as well are contemplating adoption.' 0 On the basis of this sample, it seems safe to
predict a bright future; the new rules may even prove as influential as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This will mean that
virtually all practicing attorneys, including those who seldom or
never venture into federal court, will be affected.
For some this will require a shift in approach. New burdens
have been imposed on the bar and bench by the Federal Rules'
rejection of a mechanical test which automatically excludes certain categories of evidence in favor of a flexible approach which
focuses on the impact of the proffered proof in the context of the
case." Instead of relying on black letter law to resolve evidentiary
problems, the attorney has to articulate the various factors on
which admissibility or exclusion turns. The trial judge, too, must
be prepared to explain, or the appellate court will be unable to
determine whether he properly exercised his discretion. Three
recent federal cases are instructive.
In the first, United States v. Iaconetti,'2 the crucial issue was
whether defendant had solicited a bribe from the president of a
corporation seeking a government contract or had been offered a
bribe by the president. The trial judge permitted the president's
business partner and his attorney to testify in rebuttal, over hearsay objections, that the president had reported the bribe attempt
to them on the day of his meeting with the defendant. The trial
court analyzed the statements and found that they satisfied Rule
803(24),'3 the residual hearsay exception which permits state9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.01 to § 92-39 (1960), as amended FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.01 to
§ 92.40 (Supp. 1976).
10. E.g., New York, North Dakota.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 401-403.
12. 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. FED.R. EVID. 803(24) provides:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a mate.
rial fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.
The trial court also found the statements admissible as prior consistent statements
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ments not meeting any other exception to be admitted if they
possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
and satisfy certain additional requirements."4 The trial court
found these requisite indicia of reliability in defendant's being
available for cross-examination, and in the fact that the statements were made so close in time to the event as to minimize the
risks of insincerity and faulty memory. The requirement of subdivision (A) that the statement be relevant to a material proposition of fact-which seems redundant in view of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 401-was interpreted to mean that
this hearsay exception should only be used for evidence of highly
probative value. The president's timely report of the alleged bribe
to his partner and attorney was found to meet this test, since it
made "more probable that something of consequence to the business occurred during the meeting with the defendant."1 The requirements in subdivisions (B) and (C) of Rule 803(24) were satisfied as well. Because the statements were the best evidence available to corroborate the president's testimony, and to resolve
doubt about what had actually occurred at the meeting, they
were needed to help the jury resolve the crucial issue of credibil16

ity.

The Second Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial judge
that the statements were admissible pursuant to Rule 803(24). It
apparently also agreed with his analysis because it undertook no
independent examination of how the statements met the requirements of the rule.
In United States v. Robinson, 7 on the other hand, the appellate court analyzed the evidence at great length. Defendant had
denied involvement in sales of narcotics to an undercover policeman. The trial court permitted the policeman to testify on rebuttal that defendant's alibi witness had chauffeured defendant to
a sale, had himself sold drugs to the policeman, and had been
identified by the defendant as his partner in the narcotics
rebutting charges of recent fabrication pursuant to FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(B), but the
appellate court did not reach this question. The appellate court agreed that one of the
statements qualified as an authorized admission pursuant to FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(C),
but declined to fit the other statement into this category.
14. United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
15. The final requirement of FED. R. Evm. 803(24)-that the proponent give pretrial
notice of intended use-was found by both the trial and appellate courts to be inapplicable
under the circumstances.
16. United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976).
17. 530 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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scheme. On appeal defendant claimed that this testimony was
inadmissible because it constituted extrinsic evidence of conduct
for which there had been no conviction. The appellate court found
that the testimony was not being offered to discredit the alibi
witness' general character or veracity, which the court agreed
could not be done by extrinsic evidence, 8 but rather to demonstrate bias, which may always be shown extrinsically. The court
noted that defendant and his witness, both on direct and cross,
had characterized their relationship as a simple friendship involving periodic personal loans to each other and had forsworn
any business dealings or contracts with the policeman. Accordingly, the policeman's testimony was relevant to show that the
witness' venture in drugs gave him an incentive to testify falsely
on defendant's behalf.
In addition to showing bias, the evidence had a high potential for prejudice because it also showed that the witness was
engaged in a criminal enterprise. After noting several factors in
the case which diluted this possible prejudice, however, the court
concluded that the evidence had been admitted properly.
"Here," said the court, "as elsewhere in the law of evidence, what
is required of the judge is a balancing of the probative value of
and need for the evidence against the prejudicial impact. '"'
The appellate court apparently wished its extensive discussion to serve as a model for future trials. The court suggested that
it expected more from a trial court than a "cursory" analysis
which "appears only by implication":"
[I]f the prejudice outweighs the benefit, the judge sometimes
excludes the evidence with the conclusory comment that the
case involves only "collateral" character impeachment; while if
high probative value offsets slight prejudice, he may say that
the evidence is admissible impeachment for bias. To avoid the
possibility that confusion may lurk in such labeling and shorthand, it would be preferable to confront the problem explicitly,
acknowledging and weighing both the prejudice and the probative worth of impeachment in the spirit of balancing stressed in
the newly effective Federal Rules.
While the court was directing its comments to the bench, the
implication for the bar is clear. Counsel must be prepared to
18. See FED. R. Evw. 608.
19. United States v. Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
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assist the trial court in its inquiry, or risk a retrial if the appellate
court finds that the analysis of probative worth and prejudice was
cursory.
Unfortunately, at times, despite the attorneys' best efforts,
the record will be deficient for appellate review. In United States
v. Dwyer21 defendant asserted lack of criminal responsibility.
When the defense expert unexpectedly failed to testify adequately, counsel requested permission to call a second psychiatrist. It was then Friday and the psychiatrist was unavailable
until the following Monday morning, at which time he appeared
in court. At the voir dire granted on the prosecution's request, the
defense's offer of proof indicated that the psychiatrist would supply the lacking medical testimony. The prosecution moved to
preclude on three grounds: 1) prejudice because the government's
expert was no longer available, 2) negligence by the defense in not
obtaining the psychiatrist's services earlier, and 3) taint resulting
from the expert's weekend discussion of the case with defense
counsel. Thereafter, the judge barred the expert's testimony
without relying on any of the prosecution grounds. Despite repeated requests by defense counsel, the judge refused to state any
reasons for his action. The appellate court had no difficulty in
ascertaining the high probative value of the proffered expert testimony, but it stated that the judge's refusal "to put his reasons
for exclusion on the record substantially impairs our ability to
ascertain the source of the 'prejudice' to which he referred in his
ruling. 2 2 Quoting from the Robinson opinion, the appellate court
concluded that "[tihe spirit of Rule 403 would have been better
served had the judge 'confront[ed] the problem explicitly, acknowledging and weighing both the prejudice and the probative
worth' of the proffered testimony. 21 3 Accordingly, the appellate
court held that exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a reversal.
This decision too, though explicitly concerned with the trial
court's obligation to analyze, contains a lesson for counsel. Defense attorney's offer of proof and persistence in making his objections known was in keeping with the spirit of the Rules and
highlighted the trial judge's error for the appellate court. All participants in a trial conducted pursuant to the Federal Rules must
21. 539 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976).
22. Id. at 5097.
23. Id.
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be able to explain the significance of a given item of evidence-reliance on traditional formulae and labels will not suffice.
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